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TEACHING TO THINK 
Felicity Haynes 
The University of Western Australia
ABSTRACT 
Given that a devolved curriculum 
empowers a teacher to educate for change, 
and indeed encourages cross-curricular 
critical and creative thinking, this article 
offers a broad review of three current 
strategies for helping anyone to think 
critically and creatively - instruction in 
formal logic, training in focusing attention, 
and creating a community of inquiry. It 
concludes that the latter is the preferred 
mode of teaching thinking for 
understanding and responsibility, both in 
schools and in pre-service teacher 
education, because it captures the best 
balance between student engagement, the 
presentation of external social standards 
and the need for ongoing reflection on both 
of these and because it provides an 
inclusive model of inquiry which is neither 
closed nor relativistic. 
If we are going to look for change 
in thinking in society we shall have 
to look to education to carry out its 
most fundamental task which is to 
teach thinking skills. This is more 
important than anything else. 
Education is remarkably reluctant 
to do this mainly because people 
are locked into a system which has 
an extremely limited view of what 
thinking is about. 
(de Bono, 1990: 248) 
Recent proposed revisions to the K-12 
curriculum have focused on a 
developmental model which claims to 
eschew a certain academic elitism of the 
past and move beyond a model of 
transmission of the cultural heritage 
towards a skills-based curriculum. 
Statements of ethos now generally focus 
on ensuring that school students master a 
broad range of skills and dispositions, 
including respect for others, a 
responsibility towards the environment and 
critical and creative thinking skills, and 
this relegates the necessary transmission of 
knowledge to achieve those skills to a 
lower position. While teaching thinking 
skills might not be as fundamental as de 
Bono claims, it is at least important in 
providing a way of linking acquired 
information to changing contexts of 
practice and inquiry. 
 There are problems with requiring a 
minimal set of skills, thinking or 
otherwise, for all school students if one is 
not confident that teachers already possess 
them. This is certainly true of language 
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proficiency, when often secondary teachers 
show themselves unable to summarise or 
analyse passages because they have not 
been given the skills to do so. While 
Lipman has found that the thinking skills 
of students do not often change beyond 
Grade 5, there is some evidence to suggest 
that teachers are often incapable of 
teaching critical and creative thinking and 
that even at primary school level, some 
pupils are better at it than their teachers 
(Pears, 1995). This paper briefly analyses 
some of the currently available models for 
helping student teachers to think more 
creatively and critically in the light of the 
need to foster the same disposition/s in 
their students. 
To a certain extent, the model of reflective 
practice advocated by Schon (1983) seems 
a step in the right direction. It presents a 
challenge for students, teachers and 
teacher educators to identify and recognise 
their own beliefs about learning and 
effective teaching and to clarify, develop, 
reframe and ultimately to act on new ways 
of seeing within the specific context of 
their own practice (Beare, 1989). But even 
that does not work if, as with many 
practices of metacognition, it turns out to 
be a refinement of yet a further branch or 
form of knowledge which is imposed upon 
teachers and thence upon students 
(Haynes, 1991). The relation of what 
Green (1973) called subjective and 
objective modes of reasoning and what we 
might these days term informal and formal 
discursive practices in student and teacher 
learning will be one of the pivotal foci in 
this discussion of how to teach thinking. 
In a recent article in this journal, 
McLaughlin and Hanifin (1995) showed 
that while some pre service students were 
able to reflect critically on the dimensions 
of their teaching practice, the reflection in 
their writing was largely descriptive, the 
issues reflected upon were often technical 
and the reflective activity engaged in often 
took the form of a self dialogue which 
assisted the students to adapt and 
reconstruct their own self - image. 
McLaughlin and Hanifin believed that to 
make student teachers even more reflective 
they should be encouraged to reduce the 
dichotomy that often exists between the 
formal theory of course work and the 
reality of practice, through discussions that 
focused on perceived contradictions 
between the planned professional practices 
and the students' experiences, beliefs, 
ideals and practices. They showed that, to 
a certain extent, the use of spoken and 
written language appeared to encourage 
the students' disposition to engage in 
reflective activity. The issue of what it is 
that the students are reflecting on was 
found by these researchers to be less 
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important than the procedure of reflective 
decision making and they considered the 
procedure to be crucial to the students' 
professional development. Let us examine 
to what extent the same is true of 
encouraging thinking skills, especially for 
teacher educators. 
INSTRUCTION IN FORMAL LOGIC 
In the epigraph above Edward de Bono 
refers to educators being locked into a 
system which has an extremely limited 
view of what thinking is about. It is clear 
from his other writings that he is referring 
to the type of reasoning espoused by what 
he has called (de Bono, 1990) the Gang of 
Three - Socrates, Plato and Aristotle - who 
have bequeathed us a legacy of syllogistic 
and propositional logic, based on truth 
tables, which has come to be known as 
formal logic. Familiar to most first year 
philosophy students, and indeed to many 
philosophy of education students from the 
sixties and seventies, it is the basis of 
Robert Ennis's Logic in Education. Formal 
logic is usually taught by exercises with 
truth tables, the translation of sentences 
into symbolic form, instruction in 
symbolic notation and proof of various 
theorems of logic, including learning by 
rote de Morgan's Laws. Many teachers 
from my generation will remember having 
to cope with Copi's Introduction to Formal 
Logic as part of their teacher training. In 
the eighties, Ennis (1989) was still 
claiming, in the introduction to the Cornell 
Critical Thinking Tests, that formal logic 
underpinned all informal logic and 
therefore was essential knowledge for 
those intending to become teachers. 
Noddings (1995: 78-85) retains formal 
logic as the first of the three main analytic 
approaches to teaching critical thinking. 
Even where she would confine its teaching 
to a highly-talented mathematics class, she 
sees it being of value in introducing 
students to "a way of thinking that 
encourages carefulness and precision". 
That makes its value rest on an assumption 
of transfer of skills from one area to 
another, an assumption for which there is 
no current evidence. 
Another justification for the teaching of 
formal logic was thought to be that it was a 
description of the rules by which a 
competent mind naturally works. That is a 
view largely now discredited as modernist 
but, as Noddings reminds us, even if it 
were true, would that be a reason for 
teaching its explicit rules? Why teach 
something which under normal conditions 
functions naturally? She takes the transfer 
of learning assumption one step further 
down by giving evidence (Noddings, 1995: 
82-3 ) that even learning the rules of 
formal logic does not help one to think 
logically or critically, and an awareness of 
validity does not necessarily result in valid 
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conclusions being drawn. Even when 
Scriven (1976) says that we do not need to 
teach formal logic, he displays his mastery 
of it in his text. Many who were trained in 
it have fed it into their language habits and 
passed it on unconsciously, through their 
practices. Witness Ennis's (1990) defence 
of young children being able to learn logic 
at a pre-formal stage because they 
demonstrate it very early through 
understanding such statements as "If I turn 
on the switch, the light will go on" by 
turning on the switch and expecting the 
light to go on. Some people, on the other 
hand, have never mastered it and cannot be 
persuaded that it is of any worth. One 
might surmise that, far from being a 
natural ability, formal logic may gradually 
die out of our language practices if we 
cease to promote it in schools, as 
knowledge of grammatical structure seems 
to be doing. Would this be good or bad? 
When de Bono mirrors Noddings - "We 
use little explicit logic in our everyday life 
because we have fed it into our language 
habits already" (1990:150) - he still 
believes that it is too limited to be used as 
the basis for teaching thinking skills. de 
Bono criticises the dominant place of 
formal logic in Western culture, based on 
analysis, judgement, argument and 
criticism (1995: 9) because: 
1. It does not adequately deal with 
"perception", which is by far the most 
important part of thinking in everyday 
affairs. 
2. Argument is a poor way of exploring. It 
is limited because it is more concerned 
with winning an argument than 
exploring a subject and sets up 
unnecessary adversarial positions. 
The "boxes" derived from the past may not 
be adequate to deal with a changing 
world, which is very different from the 
past.  
4. Analysis is insufficient to solve all 
problems. There is a need to supplement it 
with design. 
5. The notion that criticism is enough and 
that somehow useful progress will be made 
is absurd. 
6. There is insufficient attention to the 
generative, productive, constructive and 
creative aspects of thinking. 
7. The huge importance of the possibility 
system is largely ignored. 
Others have suggested that while the 
formal rules of logic provide a tether for 
reason, the process of formalising 
everyday language, of standing aside from 
it to look at the patterns is enough to 
achieve the purpose of "objective" 
reflection and that one does not have to 
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take the further step of applying the rules 
of formal logic . Teaching it explicitly 
appears to have little effect on the thinking 
skills we actually use (McLaren, 1988). 
We might agree that formal logic (that is, 
the valid manipulation of symbolic forms) 
does not appear to have much direct use 
for teaching teachers to think critically and 
creatively, but defend it simply for its use 
in locating and analysing the form, 
acknowledging that it does not, without 
further tools, encourage reflective practice 
or change practices and policies. 
Others have suggested that further tools 
may be those of informal logic, a second 
analytic category of teaching thinking 
mentioned by Noddings and also used in 
many popular books for trainee teachers 
(Thouless, 1965: Smith). There are two 
main ways of defining informal logic. It 
may be defined as any mode of thinking 
that is opposed to formal logic, in which 
case it covers all other types of thinking, 
including offering opinion, daydreaming, 
storytelling, categorising and feeling 
angry, and therefore loses meaning for our 
purpose, because any strategy will meet 
some particular need but not all needs. The 
other usage is derivative from formal logic, 
more obviously practical and closely 
related to ordinary discourse in form but 
depending on formal logic for its 
revelation of "crooked" thinking. This 
latter usage is common to Noddings 
(1995), a younger Ennis (1962), Govier 
(1985) and Schemer (1962). Thouless 
(1965: 170) says that his is a practical 
book, not a study of formal logic - "If we 
have a plague of flies in the house we buy 
flypapers and not a treatise on the 
zoological classification of Musca 
domestics ... The present book bears to the 
treatises of logicians the relationship of 
fly-paper to zoological classifications". 
Yet even he describes his thirty-eight 
"dishonest" tricks as "fallacies" and 
classifies them in accordance with the 
logical principles they violate. It is, to use 
a politically-incorrect term from Austin, a 
skirt word to the trouser word of formal 
logic: that is, in Derridean terms, formal 
logic is the trace which provides meaning 
to the notion of informal logic. 
The most common fallacy of informal 
logic is that of ignoratio elenchi or 
irrelevance, but irrelevance is usually 
defined as any statement which does not 
lead logically to the conclusion (Govier, 
1985). The assumptions of formal logic - 
that a statement is either true or false, that 
definitions must be precise, that emotional, 
metaphorical or vague language should be 
avoided, that facts are best situated in a 
non-contradictory set of statements - still 
hold. This mode of informal logic, like 
formal reasoning, often emphasises form 
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over content, and often lists as its skills 
functions derivative from formal logic 
such as "offering a well-formulated or 
well-organised line of reasoning, 
generalising, inferring, stating 
assumptions, offering counter examples". 
There has been some attempt to analyse 
the logical patterns in ordinary language, 
or contextually-based dialogue (Hamblin, 
1970; Girle, 1991) in order to articulate 
what makes some responses more 
appropriate than others but little to outline 
a way of teaching appropriate modes of 
response. Most work in this area has been 
done under the rubric of rhetoric, 
especially in the United States which has 
been taken over by largely by the English 
teachers and once again, like formal logic, 
focuses on the kind of analysis familiar 
through practical criticism and textual 
analysis, as with the dispositio and elocutio 
which examine arrangement and style. It is 
a form of analysis which tends therefore to 
suffer from the same faults of limited 
applicability as formal logic, even where 
modern rhetoricians like Mason and 
Washington (1992: 48) supplement it with 
activities such as progymnasmata - a 
process of transcribing text, translating it 
(for instance through tense, mode, genre 
and person changes) to change its form 
while keeping the content intact, offering a 
precis or summary or amplifying the 
passage. 
De Bono rejected formal logic because it 
was critical rather than constructive, and 
does not give us advice on how to proceed 
in any given situation. Because it operates 
on assumptions of truth/false distinctions 
and tight static definitions, he calls it rock 
logic, incapable of adjusting to the "flow" 
of everyday discourse. His strength, he 
claims, lies in his ability to have children, 
adults, business managers think laterally, 
more flexibly and therefore more 
productively. To what extent can his 
methods succeed better than formal logic 
in teaching critical and creative thinking? 
TRAINING IN FOCUSING ATTENTION 
De Bono is concerned to move away from 
the limitations of textual analysis into the 
open world of daily behaviours. If 
financial success and popularity were any 
indicator of success, he would have 
demonstrated that critical and creative 
thinking can be taught simply and easily 
through repeated practice. His recent book 
Teach Yourself to Think (1995) presents a 
very simple five-stage framework for 
thinking: 
1. The TO stage: Where am I going? With 
what do I want to end up? 
2. The LO stage: Looking at the situation. 
What information is available and what 
is needed? What are the perceptions? 
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3. The PO stage: generating possibilities. 
Setting up alternatives and new ideas. 
4. The SO stage: Choosing from among 
the possibilities. Reducing the choices 
to a line of action. 
5. The GO stage: going ahead and putting 
the thinking into action. 
So how does buying his books help trainee 
teachers to teach themselves to think 
creatively and critically? Those who have 
read his earlier books will recognise this as 
yet another frame of attention-directors, 
like that found in the Six Thinking Hats. In 
this program used at primary school level 
and in business schools, one imaginatively 
selects a White Hat to seek information 
and facts about the situation; a Red Hat to 
examine feelings and intuition; a Black 
Hat to focus on the negative logical 
aspects, to exercise caution through critical 
thinking; a Yellow Hat to looks at values 
and benefits; a Green Hat to seek 
alternatives and generate possibilities; or a 
Blue Hat to define the problem, offer an 
overview and control. 
The other de Bono program picked up 
widely in Canada, Mexico, Ireland, South 
Africa, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia 
(and, indeed, mandatory in Venezuela) is 
the Cort Thinking Program, which uses the 
attention directors such as AGO (focusing 
on Aims, Goals and Objectives), PMI 
(Plus, Minus and Interesting), C&S 
(Consequences and Sequels), FIP (First 
important Priorities), APC (Alternatives 
Possibilities and Choices) and OPV 
(attention to Other People's Point of 
View). 
De Bono describes all of these as a very 
direct tool approach to the teaching of 
thinking. They are used explicitly and 
directly, practised on short thinking items 
rather than texts, building up skills, which 
can then be transferred to other situations. 
They are a formal way of directing 
perceptual attention in a defined direction. 
John Edwards at James Cook University 
believes that these attention-directors offer 
a quick and effective method of changing 
thought behaviour and therefore should be 
encouraged. I would compare it with the 
use of electric cattle prods to prevent 
severely autistic children from self-
destructive behaviour - it acts as a stimulus 
to change past habits without necessarily 
reinforcing useful future strategies. Those 
teachers who are opposed to behaviour 
management on the grounds that it only 
deals with surface behaviour and does not 
affect deeper commitments and values 
might well ask whether this sort of training 
strategy will encourage teacher trainees or 
students to really consider different 
options, to reflect on their assumptions in 
any meaningful way. 
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Any use of question - begging terms such 
as "really" should be suspect, but the 
possible criticism applies to de Bono too. 
De Bono was trained as a doctor and, 
despite his claim to be open and lateral, his 
approach is consistent with a narrowly 
scientific behaviourism or a post-Quinean 
naturalism which assumes the brain works 
as a passive and fairly mechanical device. 
There is a major inconsistency between his 
promotion of attention-directing devices 
and his theory of mind which he has 
neither acknowledged nor addressed. He 
wrote (1969) that mind cannot be 
separated from brain, and that perception 
and processing occurs in 
"a self-organising information system 
operated by the nerve networks in the 
brain. Information and the surface have 
their own activity and the information 
arranges itself as groups, sequence and 
patterns. The process is similar to rain 
falling on a landscape and organising 
itself into stream, tributaries and rivers". 
This is still a fairly passive notion of 
thinking (de Bono, 1995: 38-9). The brain 
forms patterns from experience. Actually 
experience self-organises itself into 
patterns within the brain. We seek to 
fitthings into the appropriate pattern. We 
seek to use the boxes and definitions 
derived from experience. We usually call 
this recognition, identification or 
judgement. In his latest book he writes that 
"Computers are nothing without software. 
The human brain is just an excellent 
memory mechanism. It requires software 
to turn this memory mechanism into a 
'thinking' mechanism". He admits 
(1995:39) that: 
In some ways the purpose of thinking is to 
abolish thinking. Some people have 
succeeded in this. The purpose of thinking 
is to set up routine patterns so that we can 
always see the world through these routine 
patterns, which then tell its what to do. 
Thinking is no longer needed. 
What is it in his books that does the 
thinking? Who is the "we" that he refers 
to? This question does not arise out of any 
of his attention directors, but it confronts 
his own horizons of reference. The de 
Bono training approach underlies most 
programs espousing metacognitive 
strategies -through naming and repeated 
practice of certain behaviours, the attention 
is focused on processes which are repeated 
often enough to become automatic. It 
makes de Bono's training methods largely 
irrelevant to those educators like myself 
who still believe that education is about 
helping children and teachers to grow as 
persons within a changing social context of 
values, and about helping them to change 
current practice and theories for the better. 
There is no place for meaning-making or 
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the mature reflection we call wisdom. This 
makes the title of de Bono's latest book, 
Textbook of Wisdom, superbly ironic. His 
conception of the development of wisdom 
has nothing to do with making choices and 
connections - up to 5 we ask "Why"? From 
6-12 we ask "Why not?" And from 12-75 
we say "Because" (de Bono, 1996: 16) . 
His notion of wisdom is an extremely 
passive one - we are wise when "our 
individual perceptions settle down to give 
us our personal view of the world" (de 
Bono, 1996: 3). 1 would argue that just as 
formal logic is inadequate to cater for 
creative and practical thinking, the 
attention directors are inadequate to offer 
capacity for critical or creative change, 
evaluation and deep reflection. De Bono 
believes that "perception" is by far the 
most important part of thinking in 
everyday affairs, and once again it is a 
passive conception of "perception" which 
is very similar to sensation (Haynes, 
1978). "Perception is how the mind 
organises the information that is coming in 
from the world outside" (de Bono, 
1996:28) . How does it do this? There is no 
mechanism which can allow for even the 
critical application of his own attention-
directors to his own work. They function 
on a short-term basis to snap people out of 
past habits of thinking. Like the formal 
logicians he criticises, de Bono is locked 
into "a system which has an extremely 
limited view of what thinking is about", a 
sensation model of thinking (one might 
even say sensationalist) which does not 
include any capacity for the reflective 
reasoning considered by many to be the 
mark of higher-order thinking skills. f lis 
attention directors provide no means of 
accessing higher-order tools for evaluation 
or change of those practices, no means of 
the creative capacity to try out new ideas. 
If formal logic and attention directors each 
have their own value but are each 
insufficient to provide thinking skills to 
teachers, would a combination of the two 
suffice to improve thinking skills? Even 
combined, they seem to leave out the 
necessary engagement of the thinker. 
Dewey (1933) established strategies to 
encourage methodical thinking, and saw it 
as necessary to define thinking in tighter 
terms than the underived informal 
logicians did, but to move outside any tight 
disciplinary framework which might 
constrain growth. Though, like de Bono, 
he saw his five steps of thinking as 
description as much as prescription, he 
included personal meaning in his agenda. 
He saw the fourfold interest of children as 
making things (construction), finding out 
(inquiry), expressing themselves 
artistically and communicating (Dewey, 
1900). Thinking begins with a nagging 
sense that something is problematic, 
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something is unsealed. Exploration yields 
a hypothesis that must be tested. Next the 
thinker has to devise a plan - a set of 
means - by which the hypothesis can be 
tested. In each stage of exploration, the 
thinker considers alternatives. What then 
are the competing hypotheses? What other 
means might be used? Then of course the 
plan must be enacted. The thinker 
undergoes the consequences of the 
previous decisions and evaluates the 
results. Careful thinkers reflect on the 
process. They consider whether other 
methods or explanations might look even 
better, and they also look into the future. 
How might what they have learned here be 
used in future situations? They make an 
attempt at generalisation. Dewey's (1916) 
notion of the reflex arc shows that a 
passive stimulus-response conception of 
thinking does not adequately reflect the 
active and purposive actions required to 
make sense of external stimulations. 
His five-step pragmatic approach to 
education enabled many teachers to use his 
problem-solving model for the teaching of 
thinking which was grounded in students' 
experience of their real world, although 
many teachers made it so specifically 
focused on particular problems that it 
became more atomistic than transforming 
critical and creative thinking, it was 
nonetheless more situated in real concerns 
and solutions than de Bono's attention 
directors. His focus on the individual 
learner was particularly useful for science 
teachers who wanted students to engage in 
constructing their individual theories about 
the world from concrete experiences. In 
order for those students to be able to 
generalise from their own experiences, 
they had to reflect on them and re-present 
their experiences into a form that would 
allows them to transfer the skills acquired 
from one problem to another. It is 
compatible with Piagetian constructivism 
but tied a little too closely to a modernist 
belief that the child can individually 
construct his own reality. From where does 
the child set standards for progress in 
thinking? By a genetically determined 
structure of rules, as Piaget and Chomsky 
would have us believe? By a Rortyian 
pragmatism which requires the thinking to 
work in social and physical world? By a 
stimulus-response mechanism that is the 
time consuming trial and error testing of 
consequences? 
John McPeck is probably the best known 
critic of the notion that "critical thinking" 
can be generally identifiable by any of 
these standards. While he agrees that it is 
laudable to help students think critically 
about everyday problems, he claims (1981; 
1992: 201) all such thinking manifests 
itself as an application of one or more of 
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the historically-formed disciplines. The 
disciplines are the fruits of critical thinking 
in all the problem domains of human 
experience, and they embody what it 
means to think critically. On this ground 
student teachers would be helped to help 
their students to become critical and 
creative thinkers, by demonstrating 
mastery of their subject areas themselves, 
by knowing and being able to defend the 
assumptions on which their discipline or 
"form of knowledge" rests. Students who 
learn critical and creative thinking can 
thereby adopt an attitude of reflective 
scepticism towards claims in a given field, 
but to criticise it, they must also have a 
command of the technical language of the 
field and the accepted criteria for its use in 
argumentation. This may seem reasonable 
for secondary school teachers, for whom a 
requirement of three years of university 
teaching in their major curriculum area and 
a course in basic epistemology would seem 
to promise some hope of mastery. 
However, for the generalist primary school 
teacher, the requirement presents 
something of an impossible challenge. 
Moreover, the presentation of disciplines 
as if they were the forms of knowledge 
seems as dated a notion as that of the 
formal logicians in an age of critical 
theory. The disciplines are a useful social 
tool for creating systems of thought which 
enable us to communicate meanings more 
or less coherently but the responsible 
thinker will want/need to think beyond 
those forms. 
Metacognitivists may have thought they 
provided a solution by having children 
write down and therefore reflect upon the 
thought-processes they had used naturally 
while problem-solving. Such reflection 
should enable them to generate either 
heuristic strategies, or better still, 
algorithms, to apply to new situations. This 
is not inconsistent with the reflective 
practitioner model of teacher training 
which requires the trainee teacher to reflect 
on his/her own assumptions and to 
generate new possible theories to test in 
future action. Many teachers have claimed 
that teaching any school subject well 
means teaching not only their accumulated 
content but also what underpins them, their 
assumptions and their epistemologies and 
therefore that metacognition should be a 
process in which training teachers become 
involved. But, as with problem solving, the 
solutions became couched in step-by-step 
presentations which often precluded 
certain outcomes, rather like the Socratic 
model of inquiry which presumed there 
was a correct structure or ideal answer at 
the end of the metacognitive process. How 
can one be metacognitively aware or 
reflective without a language with which 
to think about oneself? 
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Metacognition often simply pushed the 
issue of not being able to think for oneself 
one step higher up on a hierarchy of 
representational thought. Like any 
competency-based curriculum that 
emphasises accountability to central 
standards provided by products and 
behaviours, it can easily lose contact with 
the internalised values and affective 
dispositions of the children who are being 
educated. Like de Bono's attention 
directors, it picks up the naturalistic 
assumption which devalues values and 
rational autonomous agents and therefore 
cannot be viewed as an agent of change in 
schools or teaching. Indeed, it can be seen 
that both formal logic and the attention 
directors of de Bono or the 
metacognitivists operate within 
assumptions of a fixed order and stable 
structures of mind and the world which are 
inconsistent with a poststructuralist 
position which opens up experience to 
ongoing questioning and redefinition. If 
we wish to engage teachers in an ongoing 
process of critique and reformulation, we 
will need to help teachers engage in open 
reflection and critique without determining 
the answers they might arrive at. 
Nick Peim (1993:38) suggests a 
transformation of the subject, both of 
English and the individual, by 
investigating aspects of language and 
textuality through various theories of 
discourses, semiotics, phenomenology, 
psychoanalysis and reconstruction. These 
theories all have a potentially interrogative 
inflection, insofar as they may be used to 
question established ideas, and may 
propose alternative ways of looking at 
current powerfully-dominant ideas 
(including such oppositions such as 
masculine/ feminine, reason/madness, 
normal/deviant, representation/ reality, 
doing/ thinking). They are not merely 
reconstructive but can offer different 
models, break down establish definitions 
and so open new spaces, ways of 
understanding formerly closed that can be 
used to change, develop and extend current 
teaching practices. I support his criticism 
(1993: 65) that current practices "have 
been largely founded on very restrictive 
models of language, models blind to their 
own constructed ness, blind to the political 
effects of their institutional situation and 
blind to their implication in politically 
suspect systems of belief", but am also 
open to the likelihood that opening 
everything up to question is likely to leave 
teacher trainees and school children 
anxious and floundering. How can one 
remain all inclusive without denying the 
value of any single position? 
CREATING A COMMUNITY OF  
INQUIRY 
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An alternative means of providing the 
necessary conceptual pegs upon which one 
can "hang" the reflective process, is to 
encourage the child to articulate the 
"hypothesis" for general discussion, 
getting feedback from both peers and 
teacher. This may well create more 
"problems" as others interpret his/her 
hypotheses from different values and 
epistemologies, but those very differences 
are a catalyst which provokes further 
thinking and the articulation of those 
further problems and tentative solutions 
creates an autonomous identity through 
increasing awareness of a coherent 
response to unsettledness (McLaren, 
1993). One constructs one's identity in 
opposition to, or in cooperation with, the 
orthodox conventions, and it is only within 
a genuinely open community of inquiry 
that an identity can be formed that enables 
both social and individual transformation. 
The surrounding community, whatever its 
boundaries, provides the different 
"theories" and texts against which the child 
or teacher test their opinions, beliefs and 
values. The structure is taken on trust, as it 
were, and open to negotiation and 
experiment. The community may be one of 
expertise in physics or anthropology; it 
may be one of school; it may be one of the 
dominant culture in one's suburb; it may be 
all of these combined with a global 
community of humans. 
In 1974, Matthew Lipman, frustrated with 
his inability to help university students 
think through the normal philosophical 
teaching methods, left Columbia 
University to work on a project which 
would promote communities of inquiry 
within the primary school. He was largely 
responsible for producing a series of 
philosophically-based novels and manuals 
that has become identified with the 
Philosophy for Children movement. He 
established the U.S. based Institute for the 
Advancement of Philosophy for Children 
and it has now spread to over forty 
countries, including Australia. Philosophy 
for Children consists of a series of novels 
and teachers manuals which have been 
translated and taught globally and have 
been endorsed by Robert Sternberg (in 
Baron and Stemberg, 1987) as being the 
most likely program to teach durable and 
transferable thinking skills. Lipman's 
Thinking in Education (1991) outlines the 
theoretical foundations in detail. In 
Australia, the Lipman program is being 
taught in all States, with possibly the most 
successful program operating at the 
Paddington Primary School in New South 
Wales. 
Like Lipman, Splitter and Sharp 
(1995:117,124) begin from the Deweyan 
assumption that philosophy may be taken 
as the central methodology or armature 
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around which all subjects can be 
organised, in that it provides a model of 
discovery and participation that can be 
utilised by many different teachers for 
many different subjects. Using the 
traditional philosophical areas of logic, 
ethics, epistemology, aesthetics and 
metaphysics as their foundation, they 
present a taxonomy that presents the 
function of schools to develop skills in 
reasoning and inquiry, concept formation 
and the making of meaning, through 
reading, writing, questioning, speaking and 
listening in the usual learning areas of 
language and literature, the arts and 
religion, mathematics, science and 
technology, the humanities, society and 
environment and health and physical 
education. Splitter believes that the 
teaching of syllogistic and propositional 
logic is important enough a component of 
philosophy to be taught only by teachers 
trained in philosophy and as a separate key 
learning area in the secondary school 
curriculum. This is a broader structuralist 
model than the formal logic modelbecause 
it encompasses Dewey's fourfold interests 
of children. There is an assumption that, by 
participating in a community of inquiry, 
the student or teacher educator can come 
both to construct and to know himself or 
herself. 
This model goes beyond Dewey in 
assuming, as both Habermas and Lacan 
do, that language in use, as it is in critical 
and creative thinking, is essentially 
dialogic, that every speech act springs 
from previous utterances and is structured 
in expectation of a future response. 
Critical and creative thinking, being 
dependent on language, is neither an 
automatic nor formal matter - it is mainly 
a social one used to discover and 
construct our shared world and our shared 
selves. 
This awareness of the constructive 
process takes us beyond the training 
model of de Bono and the 
metacognitivists and the formal methods 
of the logicians to make thinking a social 
practice into which one must be 
voluntarily enculturated rather than taught 
(Haynes, 1993). McLaughlin and Hanifin 
(1995) showed that reflective discussion, 
rather than written expression, helped 
students to adapt and reconstruct their 
own image. If, as Dewey (1900,1933) 
claimed, children naturally have an 
interest in constructing, inquiring, 
expressing themselves artistically and 
communicating, then maybe the aims of 
critical and creative thinking may better 
be met by creating a narrative and 
conversational style of teaching than by 
making philosophy a separate and 
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additional (K-12) key learning area as 
Splitter desires. To make philosophy 
another subject would be to run the same 
risk of turning it into a teacher-centred 
subject with all the dangers of atomism 
and alienation from the situation that 
logic, metacognition and de Bono's 
methods encourage. 
Education, it seems, is as much about the 
reflective construction of self that 
thinking allows us to construct. How can a 
teacher give children back ownership of 
their ideas without making schools an ill-
knit rag-bag of self-interested individuals? 
Is it (as other behaviourists would claim) 
that the educational ideal of an 
autonomous, tolerant and judicious person 
who has a well-thought-out ethical 
position is a social myth? 
Much of Splitter and Sharp's book reflects 
on teaching practices which either 
encourage or discourage reasonable 
thinking on the part of students, and the 
implications of making students 
responsible not only to one another but for 
the global community, for environmental 
matters, for peace, for health and for 
tolerance. One can see that this is intended 
to be a liberating model for education, 
though Dewey probably would have used 
the word "democracy" more often than the 
authors do. It does not fit easily within a 
school model which limits time for classes 
to forty-minute segments and requires 
evidence of student outcomes. 
For instance (Splitter and Sharp, 1995: 6), 
you could tell whether you had NOT 
succeeded in helping a class to think 
critically and creatively if most students 
by the end of the year: 
• did not think constructively, 
flexibly, creatively; 
• experienced difficulty when it 
came to finding reasons for their 
opinions or scrutinising with a 
critical eye their own views or the 
views of others; 
• did not welcome challenges to or 
questioning of their opinions; 
• failed to distinguish between 
knowledge and beliefs - or at 
least between well-grounded 
belief and their opinion; 
• did not perform well in written 
and verbal analysis; 
• digressed without good reasons in 
discussion and essays; 
• did not display the kind of respect 
for others and their ideas which 
would allow them to challenge 
and accept challenge with some 
sense of objectivity; and 
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• showed little regard for 
consistency or for the importance 
of exposing hidden assumptions 
and values. 
However, it would be very difficult to 
grade a student's progress sequentially in 
thinking skills other than by noting the 
student's growth towards autonomy and 
authenticity, whatever that means. 
McLaughlin and Hanifin (1995:43) 
comment that limited time for 
professional discussion and dialogue 
appeared to be a major constraint to the 
trainee teacher's engagement in reflective 
activity. The teacher must rethink 
traditional pedagogies. He or she is 
responsible for forming an ethical base by 
establishing trust in and respect for others 
through a community of inquiry and 
modelling the wonderment of 
philosophical inquiry. The openness with 
which the teacher considers the questions 
of the students is part of the entry into the 
philosophical mode which makes it more 
than any class discussion (Perrott, 1988). 
One can claim quite rightly that there is 
not time in the normal school timetables 
for students to engage in reflective 
activities either; and that is partly why 
students, rushed from one key learning 
area to another, all with disparate goals 
and outcomes, often feet alienated and 
detached from any sense of self growth or 
independence. The sense of community 
"offers the best hope to those who are 
striving for true freedom and a sense of 
meaning in their lives. Coming to see 
oneself as a person in the world is ... at 
the heart of the educational process. But 
coming to see oneself as ‘one amongst the 
others', that is, as belonging to a 
community - is at the heart of becoming a 
pesron" (Splitter and Sharp, 1995: 2423). 
Influenced by Dewey and Habermas, 
Splitter and Sharp argue that philosophy, 
based on reasoning and inquiry, concept 
formation and meaning-making, lies at the 
heart of all subject areas. Philosophy is not 
simply thinking about thinking, for that 
would be too cognitively based. 
Metacognition is necessary but not 
sufficient to improve critical judgement 
and good practice, because cognitive 
psychology in general misses the essential 
normative component underlying 
character-building and reasonableness 
which allows children to participate in the 
improvement of society. So do de Bono's 
attention directors -there is no awareness 
of quality underpinning the thinking skills. 
They are named and enumerated for 
assessment. Only by ongoing evaluation 
within a community of inquiry which is 
genuinely open can schooling become less 
fragmented and meaningless for most 
students. 
Australian Journal of Teacher Education 
 
 
17  Vol. 22, No. 1 1997 
 
The telos of education for the community 
of inquiry is a philosophy which connects 
a student's experience and opinion with 
reason, but there is some disagreement in 
all the preceding models as to where the 
main emphasis should lie. Sharp adds a 
Nietschean distrust of the systematic 
reason which de Bono might agree with. 
Many Australian teachers complained that 
the Lipman program, based on at least 
eight sequential novels, with 
accompanying teachers manuals, was too 
American, uninspiring, and that children 
came to find it tedious. Philip Cam from 
New South Wales has published short 
stories with specific themes, followed up 
by "attention directors". Like Tim Sprod in 
Tasmania, de Haan, MacColl and 
McCutcheon (1995a, 1995b) prefer to use 
existing children's books for stimulus 
materials as a way of tapping into 
children's experiences. Murris, also trys to 
move outside the propositional 
presumptions of an analytic frame and uses 
pictures to begin what is almost a textual 
analysis in the classroom. Most Philosophy 
for Children teachers would want the 
attention directors to be more than an a 
priori structure imposed by the teacher and 
arise more naturally from cues in the 
children's conversations and comments and 
questions arising from the text. Sometimes 
there can be a real hiatus in the class, as 
the teacher dramatically shifts from 
responding to the children's questions to 
leaping for a page of exercises from a 
Lipman manual. Favoured in most of the 
Australian texts is a form of open 
questions which provoke thought and 
imagination to allow growth of the 
individual, questions to which the teacher 
may have an answer, but it will be only 
one out of many: questions such as "Does 
my body belong to me, or do I belong to 
my body?", "Did we discover or invent 
mathematics", "Can a cat have a sense of 
irony?" 
The model of promoting critical and 
creative thinking which is justified at some 
length in the Splitter and Sharp book, is 
neither teacher-led discussion, training in 
habits of directing attention or the rules of 
formal logic, nor didactic presentation of 
knowledge. It is a more dialectic model 
which respects the life-worlds of the 
students and allows their contributions to 
discussions to have similar impact on the 
teacher's schemata as the teacher has on 
theirs (Haroutunian-Gordon, 1991; 
Burbules, 1993). To use Ron Reed's 
analogy, the teacher in a community of 
inquiry is like the conductor of an 
orchestra. The children are the musicians, 
making the music, providing the content as 
they develop and refine their musical 
expertise. The teacher facilitates and 
guides, providing form to the piece or 
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offering philosophical direction by the 
provision of open questions. 
Lipman is not unfamiliar with 
existentialism and his manual on Suki in 
particular, dealing with aesthetics, reveals 
a concern with authenticity that is very 
Heideggerian. But he remains committed 
to the need for the philosophically-trained 
teacher to guide children towards a 
community of inquiry. Michael Bonnett 
(1994:134), on the other hand, talks only 
about the procedures through which a child 
learns to think, and sees no need for 
teacher intervention. He uses Heideggerian 
philosophy to distinguish between 
calculative and poetic thinking, in two 
respects: their stance toward things, and 
the feelings and aspirations they elicit. In 
the first respect, he sees calculative 
thinking as self-purposeful and 
goal-oriented, analysing things into 
problems to be solved, turning things into 
defined objects which are manageable and 
familiar. Poetic thinking on the other hand 
is celebratory, openly curious, wondering, 
intuiting the wholeness of things and 
receiving them as they are, and staying 
with them in their inherent strangeness. 
Calculative reason, which seems to have a 
lot in common with the thinking of 
Aristotle and Dewey (1933), affects things, 
seeks control, makes statements and seeks 
truth as correctness. There is satisfaction as 
a result of sorting things out, getting things 
ordered and made clear, transparent. Poetic 
thinking is affected by things, allows itself 
to be vulnerable, "sings" or "says" what it 
is and seeks truth as revealing, or alethia. 
Bonnett (1994:192-3) concludes his book 
thus: 
The development of thinking in its deepest 
and fullest sense will indeed involve 
initiation into the essence of the human 
condition in the way advocated by 
existentialism ... fully-fledged authentic 
thinking is not egocentric, but 
acknowledges the negation which pervades 
whole-hearted human involvement. 
Responsibility ... is not a self-conscious 
deliberation, but a tacit responsibility 
towards a revealing relationship with the 
thing itself. This means a responding to 
what there is there in its arising from what 
is not, and a sense of wonder that things 
are. In this apprehension lies poetic 
thinking's sense of wholeness of the world - 
its intuitive sense of the ground out of 
which things arise and in which they are 
rooted, which is quite different from the 
discursive sense of interrelatedness 
conveyed through the impositions of webs 
of rationally constructed categories upon 
it. 
This is the answer to the 
deconstructionists, logicians and 
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behaviourists because it incorporates 
literally a positive and situated response in 
an responding world. Heideggerian 
authenticity, arising from responsible 
personal response, requires the curriculum 
to be lived rather than delivered, and much 
of the concomitant requirement for a 
teacher to share problems and work 
towards an openness in which they are 
resolved gives a sense of ownership and 
responsibility to all involved. In eschewing 
pre-specified perceptions of situations and 
stock answers, in listening to and freely 
responding to the subtle nuances of 
particular situations, the teacher is not 
thoughtlessly pursuing some impractical 
and irrelevant ideal but "facing up to 
reality in a fuller sense: the quality of these 
children's thinking in this situation, and the 
potential mystery and many-sidedness of 
the things and relationships that comprise 
it" (Bonnett, 1994:188). While Lipman 
would not find any of the emphasis on 
wonder, situatedness and openness 
objectionable ( the teachers manual for his 
Grade 3 book, Kio and Gus, is entitled 
"Wondering at the World"), he would, I 
believe want to emphasise more than 
Bonnett does the importance of the teacher 
or other social representative to provide 
alternative ways of opening the horizons of 
awareness. 
To what extent is the Lipman program 
incompatible with the other two modes 
mentioned here - formal logic and 
attention-directing? In an unpublished 
masters thesis from Oxford (1994), 
Tasmanian teacher Tim Sprod modified 
Lipman's (1991) model of excellent 
thinking to include both interpersonal 
skills and the sort of procedural thinking 
promoted by de Bono or the 
metacognitivists where method is 
emphasised with little content or 
engagement with the subject. For creating 
a school environment where children will 
grow up wanting to learn, and particularly 
wanting to continue to think 
philosophically, and where they will be 
more open to a democratic and responsible 
society, there has to be some attention 
directed to the abstract questions which are 
often overlooked in the grab for the quick 
fix, the attention-seeking, the immediately 
showy. While Lipman raises 
perennially-engaging issues, and provides 
excellent philosophical training for an 
adult, the presentation of his texts and 
manuals as crutches for the jejune 
philosopher-teacher to lean on suffers in 
principle the same problem as the 
commercially-successful de Bono texts. 
They may, if relied on too heavily, prevent 
rather than encourage authentic dialogue in 
the classroom. Teaching thinking must be 
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closer to an Oakeshottian conversation 
which allows the children to present and 
re-present their own narratives of their 
own lives to an actively-listening teacher, 
who will allow the children to take 
responsibility for making meaning which 
has an empirical and social outcome 
(McLaren, 1993; Giroux and McLaren, 
1986). 
At the same time, to provide for critical 
thinking as well as creative thinking, there 
must be some frame of reference, some set 
of values through which the criticisms are 
filtered. In that respect McPeck was right - 
standards for "better" critical thinking 
cannot stand outside a frame of reference. 
It is an advantage for the teacher to have 
had philosophical training to be able to 
follow through students' questions with 
further open questions, but the structure of 
any one set of de Bono's attention directors 
might well serve the same purpose. Critical 
thinking is impeded if these frames are not 
held open, if they become exclusive of 
other possible frames. It is the capacity to 
encourage holistic questioning about the 
world within an ethical community and a 
more abstracted analysis that will mark the 
excellent teachers of thinking. Training in 
formal logic may help this, but does not 
seem necessary. To become excellent 
teachers they need to be provided with the 
opportunity to enter into conversation with 
those who can direct their attention to the 
issues of life, their assumptions, the 
consistency of their arguments, in a 
context which is felt, understood and 
analysed. By insisting on 
mutually-exclusionary discourses of 
thinking, we would foreclose on openness 
which is one of the most important 
characteristics of a community of inquiry. 
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